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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did t h e p l a i n t i f f meet h i s burden of proof t o demo-
n s t r a t e t h a t t h e r e has been a m a t e r i a l change of c i rcumstances 
in o rde r t o e s t a b l i s h grounds t o t e r m i n a t e h i s alimony o b l i g a -
t i o n s ? 
2 . Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r in i t s r e fusa l t o modify t h e 
Decree of Divorce between t h e p a r t i e s t o t e r m i n a t e alimony 
r e t r o a c t i v e l y t o March 1, 1984? 
3 . Should t h e t r i a l c o u r t have awarded t h e p l a i n t i f f -
a p p e l l a n t c e r t a i n i tems of pe rsona l p roper ty for which he made 
c la im in l i g h t of t h e language of t h e Decree of Divorce and t h e 
amount of t ime which has e lapsed s ince t h e en t ry of t h e Decree 
of Divorce be fore t h e p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t made such demand? 
4 . Did t h e t r i a l judge abuse h i s d i s c r e t i o n in awarding 
a t t o r n e y f ees t o t h e de fendan t - re sponden t? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The p a r t i e s t o t h i s proceeding were divorced from one 
ano the r pu r suan t t o a Decree of Divorce en te red by t h e Third 
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court in and for S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of 
Utah on t h e 14th day of J u l y , 197 7. The p l a i n t i f f was ordered 
t o pay t o t h e defendant t h e sun of $2 00.0 0 per month a s alimony, 
through t h e Clerk of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court commenc-
ing wi th t h e month of May of 197 7. The Decree of Divorce 
f u r t h e r provided t h a t t h e payment of alimony by t h e p l a i n t i f f -
a p p e l l a n t t o t h e de fendan t - r e sponden t would t e r m i n a t e upon t h e 
remarr iage of t h e de fendan t - re sponden t and upon no o the r 
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condit ion. The defendant-respondent has not remarried. 
The p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t f i led a Pe t i t i on t o Modify the 
Decree of Divorce and sought r e l i e f by the termination of 
alimony in January of 1980. The Pe t i t i on was heard by the 
Honorable David B. Dee on the 3rd day of September 1980. Judge 
David B. Dee denied the p l a i n t i f f ' s Pe t i t i on t o Modify the 
Decree of Divorce for the termination of alimony payable t o the 
defendant. Judge Dee further ordered tha t the r igh t of the 
defendant to alimony was not conditioned upon her employment. 
The hearing was held on September 3, 1980f and indicated tha t 
the defendant had had an increase of income of $3,500.0 0 per 
year since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The court found 
no material change of circumstances t o j u s t i fy termination of 
alimony and, as indicated above, the defendant 's employment was 
not conditioned upon her r igh t to receive alimony from the 
p l a i n t i f f . 
The p l a i n t i f f brought an addi t ional Pe t i t i on to Modify the 
Decree of Divorce and sought termination of the alimony. The 
Honorable Hal Taylor heard the matter on May 5, 1980. This 
separate Pe t i t i on was decided on May 5, 1980f p r ior t o another 
P e t i t i o n before the Honorable David B. Dee and ruled upon by 
Judge Taylor in May of 19 80. The finding of the Honorable Hal 
Taylor was t ha t there was no modification of the alimony and 
t h a t the p l a i n t i f f was ordered to continue his payments of 
$200.0 0 per month t o the defendant. 
The p l a i n t i f f f i led an addi t ional Motion t o terminate his 
alimony, which Motion was heard before the Honorable Kenneth 
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Rigtrup on October 14, 1981. Judge Rigtrup found no j u s t i f i c a -
t i o t o modify the alimony award t o the defendant and the 
p l a i n t i f f was ordered t o continue his payments of $200.0 0 per 
month to the defendant. 
The defendant, however, f i led an Order t o Show Cause 
agains t the p l a i n t i f f for nonpayment of alimony and the same was 
heard on June 1, 1982, before the Honorable Larry Kel ler . The 
p l a i n t i f f was considered in contempt of court for his f a i l u r e to 
pay the alimony payments t o defendant. The p l a i n t i f f raised the 
issue of termination of alimony in the Order t o Shew Cause 
proceeding and f i l ed h i s own Motion t o terminate alimony before 
Judge Kel ler . Judge Kel ler granted a judgment in favor of the 
defendant for alimony ar rearages in the sum of $2,2 05.0 0 to and 
including April 3 0, 19 82, The defendant was granted further 
r e l i e f by an automatic garnishment of the mi l i ta ry ret irement 
pay of the p l a i n t i f f . The court found no material change of 
circumstance and did not modify the Decree of Divorce as 
requested by the p l a i n t i f f . Judge Keller ordered the p l a i n t i f f 
t o continue his payment a t the r a t e of $200.0 0 per month to the 
defendant for alimony. 
The defendant f i l ed an Order t o Shew Cause to obtain a new 
judgment for alimony ar rearages against the p l a i n t i f f in May of 
1984. The p l a i n t i f f , in tu rn , f i led a P e t i t i o n t o Modify the 
Decree of Divorce. These two matters are the matters which were 
heard by the Honorable John Rokich. This matter was i n i t i a l l y 
heard before the Domestic Relat ions Commissioner, Sandra Peuler , 
and her recommendation was issued on June 7, 1984. The 
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recommendation of the Domestic Relat ions Commissioner was t ha t 
the p l a i n t i f f ' s Pe t i t i on t o Modify Alimony be denied. The 
p l a i n t i f f ' s request for the return of his items of personal 
property were fur ther denied. The defendant was ordered to 
present t o the p l a i n t i f f the l i f e insurance policy requested 
within t h i r t y daysf i f the said policy was in her possession. 
The Domestic Relat ions Commissioner recommended alimony 
arrearages be awarded t o the defendant in judgment form in the 
amount of $5,000.00 for the period of May 1, 1982, to and 
including May 31, 1984. There was no recommendation for a 
finding of contempt against the p l a in t i f f . The Domestic 
Relat ions Commissioner recommended attorney fees in favor of the 
defendant in the sun of $200.0 0. 
The p l a i n t i f f objected t o the Commissioner's recommendation 
on Ju ly 12, 1984. The matter was scheduled for t r i a l before the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder and s e t for hearing on September 6, 
1984. The p l a i n t i f f f i l ed an Affidavit of Prejudice and claimed 
tha t Judge Conder should disqualify himself from hearing the 
case. As a r e s u l t , Judge Conder deferred the case for further 
hearing. The matter came to t r i a l on December 28, 1984, before 
the Honorable John Rokich. 
The Motion of the defendant seeks a judgment for alimony 
ar rearages , for contempt of cour t , and for an order stopping the 
p l a i n t i f f from harrassment of the defendant by continuously 
bringing p e t i t i o n s t o modify the Decree of Divorce r e l a t ive to 
the issue of alimony, and for an award of attorney fees . The 
p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for Modification seeks the following: 
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1* Termination of alimony; 
2. Return of c e r t a i n personal property; 
3. Surrender of a Metropolitan Life Insurance pol icy; 
4. An award of at torney fees . 
The p l a i n t i f f submitted a P l a i n t i f f ' s Tr ia l Brief a t the hearing 
on December 28, 1984, and the defendant-respondent f i led a 
Memorandum in Support of her Order t o Shew Cause and in 
opposi t ion t o the p l a i n t i f f s modification request , with said 
Memorandum being f i l ed on the 5th day of February, 19 85. The 
p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t misstated cer ta in fac t s in h is Tr ia l Brief. 
The p l a i n t i f f represented t o the court t ha t the defendant 
deducted $7 5.0 0 from each paycheck and deposited the same 
d i r e c t l y in to her savings plan. The p l a i n t i f f fa i led t o mention 
t h a t the defendant drew these suns of money from her savings 
plan for her own ca re , support and maintenance and a l so for 
ce r ta in home improvements and r e p a i r s . The p l a i n t i f f fur ther 
alleged t h a t the defendant had several accounts with savings 
i n s t i t u t i o n s which she had not disclosed through discovery 
reques ts . These bank accounts and one c e r t i f i c a t e of deposit 
were the specif ic moneys received from her son, Tory Porco. 
Tony Porco deposited ce r t a in suns of money in to a j o i n t account 
with his mother in order t o provide her with ce r ta in funds in 
the event of his death. Tony Porco further provided the funds 
t o acquire a c e r t i f i c a t e of deposi t . The other c e r t i f i c a t e of 
deposi t in the sun of $3,0 00.0 0 was acquired by the defendant 
from her share of the bonds d i s t r ibu ted t o her under the Decree 
of Divorce. The p l a i n t i f f received an equal nunber of bonds 
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from the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the mari tal e s t a t e . The p l a in t i f f made 
no explanation as t o what he had done with his share of the 
bonds. 
The p a r t i e s had a marriage of twenty-seven years of 
durat ion from 1950 t o 1977. The p l a i n t i f f i s new sixty years of 
age and in good hea l th . The p l a i n t i f f served twenty-three years 
with the United S ta tes Army and had twelve subsequent years with 
c i v i l se rv ice . The p l a i n t i f f had been r e t i r ed for several years 
and had not elected to obtain employment t o supplement his 
income. He received f u l l medical coverage with free medical 
care a t any local army base. The p l a i n t i f f received a l i f e 
insurance benefi t and had a complete ret irement plan a t his 
d isposa l . The p l a i n t i f f had and s t i l l has no dependents. 
The defendant is s ix ty- f ive years of age with numerous 
hea l th problems. (T.p.261). She has high blood pressure and has 
been t rea ted by Dr. Lynn Lagerquist . The defendant sustained an 
indus t r i a l injury in the f a l l of 1983 to her back and underwent 
physical therapy for a subs tan t ia l period of time. The defen-
dant has the equivalent of a second grade education and has 
d i f f i cu l ty in communicating in the English language. The 
defendant has no sources of income other than her employment and 
the alimony payment which the p l a i n t i f f has refused and 
continues t o refuse to pay. 
The p l a i n t i f f alleged in his Tr ia l Brief t ha t the defendant 
had the a v a i l a b i l i t y of accumulating retirement benef i t s which 
w i l l fu l ly vest a f te r ten years of employment. The defendant i s 
not in good heal th and is expected t o r e t i r e because of i l l 
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hea l th , which w i l l r e s u l t in no retirement b e n e f i t s t o her from 
the Holy Cross Hospital as she w i l l not have ciccumulated ten 
f u l l years of gainful employment. The defendant w i l l not 
rece ive retirement b e n e f i t s from the Holy Cross Hospital in 
l i g h t of her age and unl ike l ihood of her a b i l i t y t o perform ten 
consecut ive and complete years of employment with the h o s p i t a l . 
The p l a i n t i f f maintained tha t the defendant suffered no maladies 
which would prevent her from working; n e v e r t h e l e s s , the 
defendant presented evidence concerning her medical condit ion 
and her permanent medical problems. 
The p l a i n t i f f sought the termination of alimony payable t o 
the defendant. The evidence indicated that the p l a i n t i f f 
received $6 30.0 0 per month from his retirement b e n e f i t s through 
the United S t a t e s Government a t the time of the Decree of 
Divorce. The p l a i n t i f f ' s l a s t attempt a t modif icat ion of the 
Decree of Divorce occurred in October of 1982. The p l a i n t i f f 
f a i l e d t o demonstrate a material change of circumstances in h i s 
favor t o j u s t i f y the reduct ion or termination of alimony payable 
to the defendant. In October of 1982, the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
retirement b e n e f i t s provided a gross monthly income of $1,3 60.0 0 
per month with an FICA deduction in the sum of $215.0 0 per 
month, leaving a net monthly income of $1,14 5.0 0 per month. In 
the summer of 1984, the retirement b e n e f i t s payable t o the 
p l a i n t i f f increased t o $1,4 04.0 0 per month as gross monthly 
income. The FICA deduction was $2 02.19 leaving a net monthly 
pay in favor of the p l a i n t i f f in the sun of $1,2 01 .81 . The 
defendant has not received updated information s ince June of 
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1984; however, the ret irement benef i ts t o the p l a in t i f f have 
escalated and w i l l continue t o esca la te on an annual basis as 
indicated by his payment his tory from the retirement program 
through the United S ta tes Government. His net monthly income 
from the ret irement benef i t s through the United S ta tes 
Government has doubled since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
The above-ent i t led court made inquiry of the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
counsel for an explanation as t o what the p l a i n t i f f did with the 
money he received from his bonds from the mari tal e s t a t e , 
information from hew his savings account in the sum of $1,800.0 0 
was expended and what d i spos i t ion was made of the sum of 
$21,0 00.0 0f which the p l a i n t i f f received as his share of the net 
proceeds from the sale of the mari tal residence. The p l a i n t i f f 
has refused and fa i led to d isc lose ary such information t o 
e i t he r the t r i a l court or t o defendant 's counsel. The p l a i n t i f f 
was further requested to produce his 1982 and 1983 income tax 
re turns by order of the t r i a l court and has continued t o refuse 
to do so and, as of t h i s da te , the defendant 's attorney has 
received no such information. 
The defendant c l ea r ly indicated t h a t the proceeds which she 
received from the sale of her share of the bonds were used t o 
purchase the savings c e r t i f i c a t e a t Valley Bank & Trust Company, 
designated as Savings Ce r t i f i c a t e No. 247 04-21, in the face 
amount of $2,0 00.0 0. The other savings c e r t i f i c a t e designated 
as No. 24716-21 in the face amount of $1,0 00.0 0 was purchased by 
her son, Tory Porco, wherein Tory Porco l i s t e d himself, his 
mother, and his s i s t e r , Maria Simister , as j o i n t owners of the 
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savings c e r t i f i c a t e in order that h is mother and h i s s i s t e r 
might share in those proceeds in the event of h is death. 
The defendant t e s t i f i e d t o the court that she used the 
proceeds from the s a l e of the marital residence t o acquire her 
present home. Because of her incapabi l i ty t o obtain f inancing f 
the home was purchased in the name of her son and daughter, and, 
in turn, conveyed t o her by them. The f inancing, through the 
mortgage lending i n s t i t u t i o n f remains in the name of the two 
chi ldren because of the f a c t that the defendant did not qual i fy 
for such f inancing in l i g h t of her income. 
The defendant t e s t i f i e d that her current gross monthly 
income i s $86 0.80 per monthf with t o t a l deductions in the sum of 
$231.2 8 per month, leaving her a present net monthly income of 
$6 29.5 2 per month. This i s based upon her current rate of pay 
of $5.34 per hour. The defendant further t e s t i f i e d that her 
rate of pay in May of 19 82 was $4.83 per hour with a gross 
monthly income of $83 0.7 6 per month and a net monthly income of 
$612.69. The defendant experienced an increase of net monthly 
pay from $612.69 t o $629.52 s ince the l a s t attempt a t 
modif icat ion of the Decree of Divorce by the p l a i n t i f f in May of 
1982. The p l a i n t i f f has c l e a r l y had a more subs tant ia l increase 
of monthly income from his retirement payf regardless of 
employment/ as compared t o that of the defendant s ince May of 
1982. The defendant further t e s t i f i e d that her 1981 monthly 
expenses were $780.00 per month. She further t e s t i f i e d that her 
current monthly expenses were approximately $9 90.4 9 per month. 
The p l a i n t i f f ' s attorney attacked cer ta in expenses of the 
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defendant, such as her u t i l i t i e s , t r anspor ta t ion and telephone 
expenses. Even taking in to considerat ion a deduction for some 
of those monthly expenses, the current monthly expenses of the 
defendant would be a t l e a s t $916.0 0 per month. This c lea r ly 
ind ica tes t ha t she i s in need of an excess of $200.0 0 per month 
t o meet her current monthly l iv ing expenses. 
The p l a i n t i f f claims current monthly l iving expenses of 
$1,280.00 in his Amended Answers t o In t e r roga to r i e s . The court 
expressed real concern over t h i s fact t h a t the p l a i n t i f f is 
present ly l iv ing in the S ta te of Texas in a renta l property and 
t h a t his monthly expenses are in excess of $1,280.00. The 
p l a i n t i f f c l ea r ly has medical and dental care through his 
benef i t s from his employment without any charge to him. He has 
further benef i t s of the purchase of food, clothing and other 
supplies through the mi l i ta ry base, which would give him a 
subs tant ia l reduction in his monthly expenses. His claims for 
vehicle repa i r s and pa r t s are questionable in l i g h t of the fact 
t ha t many of the invoices presented a t t r i a l were prepared in 
his own handwriting. The p l a i n t i f f claimed subs tant ia l expenses 
for repai r of motor vehic les ; never the less , he received a Jeep, 
a truck and a camper from the mari tal e s t a t e by v i r tue of the 
Divorce Decree. The defendant received no t ranspor ta t ion from 
the Decree of Divorce and does not have a Utah ope ra to r ' s 
permit. 
The p l a i n t i f f claims tha t the defendant acquired a 
subs tan t ia l sun of money in the Holy Cross Employees1 Federal 
Credit Union account as a resu l t of the deductions made 
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semimonthly in the sun of $7 5.0 0. The e x h i b i t introduced in to 
evidence c l e a r l y shews t h a t the balance in the defendant's 
account as of August 2 3 , 1984f was the sum of $291.81. The 
defendant t e s t i f i e d that she had s l i g h t l y in excess of $100.0 0 
in the Holy Cross Federal Employees Credit Union account a t the 
time of the t r i a l of the case on December 2 8, 1984. The 
p l a i n t i f f ' s attorney argued tha t the defendant c l e a r l y s tarted 
t o withdraw the money from t h i s account a f ter t h i s matter was 
underway in the t r i a l court for modif icat ion by the p l a i n t i f f . 
The actual record from the c r e d i t union account does f however, 
c l e a r l y ind ica te that there were substant ia l withdrawals a t 
periods of time prior t o the i n i t i a t i o n of t h i s modif icat ion 
proceeding. In f a c t , the documents c l e a r l y indicate that the 
fol lowing sums of money were withdrawn from the c r e d i t union 
account under the fo l lowing dates : 
August 1, 1980 1,550.00 
October 2, 19 81 1,0 00.0 0 
April 8 , 1982 1,200.00 
January 18, 1983 1,400.00 
July 3 , 1984 3 ,311.00 (T.p.65) 
The defendant t e s t i f i e d a t the time of t r i a l that she made 
a substant ia l withdrawal in July of 1984 because of numerous 
home improvements t o be made t o her home. The defendant further 
t e s t i f i e d that the fo l lowing home improvements were needed t o 
the home: Carpet replacement, kitchen cab ine t s , new roof, 
aluminum f a s c i a , wal l i n s u l a t i o n , wall papering, replacement of 
doors and the f in i sh ing of the basement. The defendant has 
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c lea r ly used the c r ed i t union account as a vehicle to earn some 
i n t e r e s t on her income in order t o withdraw the same for her own 
care f support and maintenance and for the home improvements* 
At the time of t r i a l , the defendant further t e s t i f i e d t ha t 
her son, Tony Porcof had provided her with approximately $150.0 0 
to $200.0 0 per month for the two pr ior years in order t o a s s i s t 
her with her care , support and maintenance of exis t ing expenses. 
(T.p.269). The defendant 's daughter t e s t i f i e d tha t she was 
providing the defendant approximately $6 0.0 0 per month as income 
for the past eighteen months t o a s s i s t her in meeting her 
current and ongoing expenses. (T.p.74) . This c l ea r ly indica tes 
t ha t the defendant had received in excess of $3,480.00 from her 
two chi ldren in order to meet ongoing expenses because of the 
f a i l u r e of the p l a i n t i f f t o make alimony payments to a s s i s t her 
with her own care f support and maintenance. 
The p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t argued t ha t the defendant-
respondent was withdrawing $20.0 0 per month in order t o purchase 
an individual ret irement account. The defendant indicated tha t 
she had been placing $20.0 0 per month in to a retirement account 
in order to provide her with some source of income af ter she 
terminates her employment with the Holy Cross Hospital for 
medical reasons. The defendant sha l l have no other source of 
income af ter the termination of her employment by reason of her 
age and heal th reasons. The only other income sources she w i l l 
have upon ret irement w i l l be her Social Security benef i t s . The 
p l a i n t i f f has made no voluntary payment in alimony to the 
defendant since 197 7. The defendant has sought legal remedy 
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through the above-ent i t led cour t t o obtain judgments and garnish 
the ret irement of the p l a i n t i f f to provide some means of 
support. The defendant was required t o garnish the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
mi l i ta ry ret i rement pay in order t o co l l ec t upon her 19 82 
judgment. She has not received any income from the p l a i n t i f f 
through alimony since the ear ly summer of 19 84f u n t i l she 
obtained the judgment of May 7, 19 85. The defendant has had t o 
r e s o r t t o the chi ldren t o supplement her income in order t o meet 
her ongoing expenses. 
At the time of t r i a l / the p l a i n t i f f claimed tha t he did not 
have su f f i c i en t income in order t o meet h is ongoing expenses in 
t h a t he claimed $l f2 80.0 0 per month in expenses and ye t received 
s l i g h t l y in excess of $l f200.00 per month as income. 
Nevertheless/ the p l a i n t i f f never explained what he did with 
regard t o the d i spos i t i on of his camper and other motor veh ic le . 
The court questioned h i s reasoning as t o why he retained an old 
t ruck when, in fac t / he had these other mari tal a s se t s and his 
proceeds from the sale of the mari tal residence in excess of 
$21 f000.00. The p l a i n t i f f made th ree separate t r i p s from the 
S ta te of Texas since the modification proceeding in the spring 
of 1984. The p l a i n t i f f has continued t o refuse t o produce any 
documents concerning h i s income in order to properly advise the 
cour t . The defendant/ never the less , did provide her 1982 and 
1983 income tax r e tu rns t o the court under a production of 
documents dated January 9f 1985. The income tax re turns of the 
defendant c l ea r ly ind ica te subs tan t ia l medical expenses which 
she has incurred and has been required t o pay above and beyond 
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her medical insurance plan through her employment a t the Holy 
Cross Hospital , Her medical plan i s a standard eighty percent 
(80%) deductible coverage plan with a twenty percent (20%) 
obl igat ion to pay for the expenses. The plan only covers f i f ty 
percent (50%) of dental care . The p l a i n t i f f fai led to 
demonstrate a t t r i a l a material change of circumstances t o 
j u s t i f y the reduction and/or termination of alimony. The t r i a l 
court awarded the defendant a judgment against the p l a i n t i f f for 
$7,000.00 as alimony arrearages from May 1, 1982 to and 
including March 31 , 1985, The defendant i s new required to 
garnish the mi l i tary retirement pay t o co l l ec t on the alimony 
arrearage. The p l a i n t i f f has refused and continues to refuse to 
pay any ongoing alimony. Therefore, the defendant has to re ly 
upon the alimony arrearage judgment t o co l l ec t any sums of money 
for her care , support and maintenance from the p l a i n t i f f . 
The p l a i n t i f f further argued t h a t ce r ta in items of personal 
property should be returned t o him. The defendant c lea r ly 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t the handmade gun cabinet was made by her own son, 
Tony, and t ha t i t was not pa r t of the mari tal e s t a t e and has 
been in the possession of Tory Porco. The defendant further 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t she had not seen and never had possession of the 
gold pocket watch, portable battery recharge r and the 12' copper 
jumper cables . The defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t the Coleman cooler 
was awarded t o her under the Decree of Divorce as well as the 
Remington typewri ter , horsepower motors and the four beer mug 
s e t . (T.p.75-76). The Decree of Divorce was specif ic as to 
ce r ta in handtools t o be awarded t o the p l a i n t i f f . The four beer 
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mug s e t is not a handtool. The Coleman cooler i s not a 
handtool. The Remington manual typewriter was not a handtool 
and was thrown out because i t was not functional a t the time of 
the Decree of Divorce. The e l e c t r i c motors where not working a t 
the time of the Decree of Divorce and were junked by the 
defendant. The weight s e t was a g i f t from the defendant t o her 
sonf Tony Porcof and i s in the son ' s possession. The radia l arm 
saw with cabinet and accessor ies i s not a handtool as outl ined 
in the Decree of Divorce and has been in the defendant 's 
possession for the pas t e igh t years . The defendant t e s t i f i e d 
t h a t she purchased the rad ia l arm saw with her own funds. The 
claims by the p l a i n t i f f for such items of personal property are 
unfounded. The said items do not qualify as personal property 
awarded t o the p l a i n t i f f under the Decree of Divorce and were 
properly awarded t o the defendant. The t r i a l court upheld the 
recommendation of the Domestic Relat ions Commissioner t ha t the 
items of personal property remain in the possession of the 
defendant. 
The testimony of the defendant and of her daughter, Maria 
Simis ter , c l e a r l y ind ica te t h a t the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
policy was cashed in several years ago by Maria Simister in 
1980. Maria Simister t e s t i f i e d t h a t she paid the premiums since 
age s ix teen and t h a t her mother paid them pr ior t o age s ix teen . 
The defendant fur ther t e s t i f i e d t h a t she had a l i f e insurance 
policy with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, which policy 
was issued on May 1, 19 57. This l i f e insurance policy was 
purchased by the defendant as the named insured and she has made 
a l l of t h e premium payments t h e r e o n . This po l icy had a face 
va lue of $ l f 0 00.0 0 and named Guido C. Porco as t h e b e n e f i c i a r y . 
The bene f i c i a ry was changed on August 2 4, 1978 by t h e defendant 
t o her c h i l d r e n . This i s c l e a r l y a po l i cy purchased and paid 
fo r by t h e defendant and i s not a po l icy owned or acquired by 
t h e p l a i n t i f f . In o t h e r words, t h e p l a i n t i f f has never been t h e 
owner of any Met ropo l i t an L i fe Insurance po l icy as c la imed. The 
one l i f e insurance po l icy was owned by Maria S i m i s t e r . She 
cashed in t h i s p o l i c y . She had t h e r i g h t t o cash in t h e 
po l i cy s ince she was t h e owner and had paid t h e premiums. The 
o the r l i f e insurance po l icy was owned and paid for by t h e 
defendant . She i s c l e a r l y e n t i t l e d t o t h i s p o l i c y . 
The i n d i v i d u a l r e t i r e m e n t account of t h e defendant has been 
funded, t o some e x t e n t , by her c h i l d r e n and, in a d d i t i o n , they 
have provided her wi th income in order t o meet her ongoing 
l i v i n g expenses . The expenses for gas hea t i ng t o t h e r e s idence 
of t h e defendant were h igher p r i o r t o t h e spr ing of 1984, in 
t h a t t h e defendant obta ined a coal and woodburning s tove from 
her son in 1984 and, a s a r e s u l t , reduced her fuel b i l l . The 
defendant h a s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , incur red t h e fol lowing expenses for 
h e a t i n g , a s were in t roduced a t t h e t ime of t r i a l : 
a) Purchase of wood permi t (September 2 , 1984) $10.0 0 
b) Purchase of coal (September 25 , 1984) $90.16 
c) Tony Porco made two t r i p s of 130 m i l e s per t r i p t o 
a c q u i r e wood for t h e woodburning s tove $53.3 0 
d) Cost of t h e chain saw t o cu t t h e wood $200.0 0 
e) Gas and o i l for chain saw $7.50 
f) 1 - chain $16.00 
g) Defendant e s t imates the purchase for addit ional coal 
for 1984-1985 year $50.00 
The defendant's son, Tony Porco f has expended in excess of 
s i x t e e n hours of labor t o pick up and cut the wood for the 
defendant. He has further expended an addit ional e igh t hours t o 
s p l i t the wood for the defendant. With h i s labor a t the rate of 
$8.0 0 per hourr the defendant would be required t o pay the sum 
of $292.0 0. Therefore f the t o t a l addit ional heating expense 
incurred by the defendant f in addit ion t o her Mountain Fuel 
Supply o b l i g a t i o n f was $458.96. This cos t was, in addit ion t o 
her Mountain Fuel Supply b i l l s during the ear ly winter of 1984 
and 1985f which are s e t for th as fo l lows: 
1) September 2 8 t o October 2 9 $46.5 0 
2) October 29 t o November 29 $46.50 
3) November 29 t o December 31 $46.50 
The average monthly payment under the budget plan with Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company of the defendant i s $46.5 0 per month. 
Therefore, the heating expenses of the defendant are 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y greater than as indicated by the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
counsel a t the t r i a l of t h i s matter on December 28, 1984. The 
defendant has attached hereto documentation t o support these 
expenses . 
The defendant-respondent has further incurred in excess of 
$3,14 9.3 9 in home improvements during the year 19 84. Copies of 
the invo ices were attached t o the Memorandum of the Defendant-
Appellant in support of her Order t o Shew Cause and in 
opposition t o the p l a i n t i f f ' s modification dated February 5, 
1985. The defendant further provided addi t ional information t o 
the court r e l a t i ve to her income. The gross income reported on 
her 1984 income tax re turn was $11,846.13. This was indicated 
as her gross income for the 19 84 year as represented by the W-2 
form attached to the Memorandum, 
The p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t argued t h a t the modification of the 
Decree of Divorce should be re t roac t ive as of March 1, 1984, the 
alleged date of the issuance of the Order to Show Cause. 
Counsel for both p a r t i e s submitted memoranda of law re l a t ive to 
t h i s i s sue . 
The p l a i n t i f f alleged a t t r i a l t ha t the defendant was 
underwriting the defendant 's annuity, savings and retirement 
plan accounts; never the less , the defendant c l ea r ly indicated 
t h a t the c r ed i t union account was p r a c t i c a l l y depleted. The 
funds from the c r ed i t union account were used t o support the 
defendant and for her home improvements. The defendant further 
indicated t ha t she had received no ongoing alimony payments from 
the p l a i n t i f f since 1977 a t the time of the Divorce Decree. The 
alleged savings and annuity accounts of the defendant were j o i n t 
accounts placed in the names of the defendant and her son or her 
daughter by v i r tue of proceeds invested by her son from his own 
income. Tony Porco, the sonf provided ce r ta in j o i n t bank 
accounts and a savings c e r t i f i c a t e in his name and the name of 
his mother, the defendant, in order to a s s i s t her in the event 
of his death. The p l a i n t i f f ' s income has not financed in any 
manner nor has i t supplemented any annuity, savings or 
ret irement plan of the defendant. 
The t r i a l court entered a judgment and order in favor of 
the defendant aga ins t the p l a i n t i f f denying the p l a i n t i f f 
P e t i t i o n t o Modify the Decree of Divorce in reference to the 
reduction in alimony. The t r i a l court further denied the 
p l a in t i f f 1 s p e t i t i o n for an award of personal property. The 
defendant was ordered t o continue his ongoing alimony payments 
of $2 00.0 0 per month without any change or modification. The 
p l a i n t i f f was awarded his r i g h t t o make claim against the 
daughter, Maria S imis ter , and/or Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company for the $l r0 00.0 0 l i f e insurance pol icy. The defendant 
was awarded attorney fees in the sun of $1,5 00.0 0, plus her 
cos t s of court incurred in t h i s ac t ion . The p l a i n t i f f was 
ordered t o pay for h i s own attorney fees and for cos ts incurred 
by him in the proceeding. 
The p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t a l l eges under the Statement of 
Facts in his Brief on Appeal t ha t the Decree of Divorce provided 
t h a t the alimony payments would terminate upon the defendant-
respondent 's remarriage. He fur ther a l l eges , t h a t Judge Sncw's 
decis ion contains no such provis ion. I t was the attorney for 
the p l a i n t i f f who prepared the Decree of Divorce and the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law not the defendant 's 
a t to rney . 
The p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t a l l eges t h a t the defendant-
respondent u t i l i z e d t h e fund in her c r ed i t union account a t Holy 
Cross Hospital for "household expenditures" T.P.225. The 
p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t , however, claims t h a t the defendant-
respondent did not withdraw any funds from the account u n t i l 
a f te r the hearing before the Domestic Relat ions Commissioner. 
The defendant-respondent has already indicated t h a t a 
subs tan t ia l port ion of these funds were spent before the hearing 
before the Domestic Relat ions Commissioner. 
The plain t i f f - appe l l an t claims t h a t he purchased the items 
of personal property during his marriage to the defendant-
respondent. There was no evidence t h a t he ac tua l ly purchased 
the items, which was produced a t the time of t r i a l . The 
p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t claims t h a t he produced records showing the 
purchase of the radia l arm saw; however, the actual money used 
t o purchase the saw was t ha t of the defendant-respondent, as 
t e s t i f i e d to by her on the witness stand a t the time of t r i a l . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The evidence presented a t the time of t r i a l by the 
p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t fa i led t o meet the t e s t of the preponder-
ance of the evidence. The p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t fa i led t o demon-
s t r a t e any material change of circumstances to ju s t i fy the 
termination of alimony. The defendant-respondent demonstrated 
only s l i g h t increases in her income since the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce and more spec i f i ca l ly since May of 1982. The 
p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t has had subs tan t ia l increases in his income 
from his ret irement benef i t s since May of 1982. The p l a i n t i f f -
appel lant fa i led to demonstrate ary savings accumulation by the 
defendant-respondent. Therefore, the decision of the t r i a l 
court should be upheld for the p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e to 
meet his burden of proof. 
2. The decision of the t r ia l court to refuse to modify 
the Decree of Divorce retroactively to March 1, 1984 i s correct. 
The defendant-respondent has submitted numerous cases which 
indicate that this i s d irect ly the position of the Utah State 
Supreme Court* There i s no evidence to demonstrate that the 
t r ia l court erred in i t s refusal to modify the Decree of Divorce 
or to modify i t retroactively* This i s c learly not the trend of 
the law and the t r ia l court ruled in accordance with the 
decisions of th is court* 
3* The language of the Decree of Divorce clearly set 
forth the award of personal property of the parties . The items 
disputed by the plaint i f f -appel lant were clearly adjudicated at 
the time of t r ia l and are c learly set forth in the Decree of 
Divorce. The matter as to the division of personal property i s 
res judicata. It has been more than seven years since the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce when the plaintiff-appel lant raises 
th is issue. The matter i s c learly untimely and the p la int i f f -
appellant has no right to seek a modification of the Decree of 
Divorce on this basis . The plaintiff-appel lant had a period of 
thirty days from and after the entry of the Decree of Divorce in 
which to appeal the decision of the t r ia l court as to the 
divis ion of the marital e s ta te . The plaintiff-appel lant did not 
e l ec t to do so and new t r i e s to seek a remedy at this la te date. 
4. The tr ia l court did not abuse i t s discretion in 
awarding the defendant-respondent her reasonable attorney fees . 
She clearly demonstrated the reasonableness and the need for 
such attorney fees . The defendant-respondent has been to court 
on several occas ions s ince the entry of the Decree of Divorce t o 
defend her p o s i t i o n against the p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t r e l a t i v e t o 
h i s claims for r e l i e f as t o the termination of alimony. The 
defendant-respondent has prevailed on every occasion. The 
defendant-respondent has been required t o expend substant ia l 
sums of money in order t o defend her p o s i t i o n in t h i s case . The 
t r i a l court has wide la t i tude and d i s c r e t i o n in making t h i s 
judgment. The t r i a l court f a i r l y and equitably made i t s ru l ing . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO DEMONSTRATE 
THAT THERE HAS BEEN A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH GROUNDS TO EITHER MODIFY OR 
TERMINATE HIS ALIMONY OBLIGATION. 
The Utah State Supreme Court held that the burden of 
showing a substant ia l change of ci reunstances i s upon the party 
pe t i t i on ing for the modif icat ion of alimony and support 
provis ions under the Divorce Decree. Allen v s . AllenF 2 5 Utah 
2d 87, 475. P.2d 1021 (1970). In t h i s s p e c i f i c case , the wife 
subsequently found employmentf the former residence was sold and 
the proceeds divided, and one of the daughters had married and 
l e f t the home and the other had secured gainful employment. The 
court found that these f a c t s did not c o n s t i t u t e a substant ia l 
change of material circumstances warranting modif icat ion of the 
alimony provis ions of the Decree of Divorce. The f a c t s and 
circumstances are s u b s t a n t i a l l y material in change as those 
compared t o the defendant in t h i s proceeding and the court did 
not consider those f a c t s as substant ia l material change of 
circumstance. 
The Supreme Court of Utah further held t h a t the divorce 
cour ts are deemed t o have broad equi table powers in safe-
guarding the i n t e r e s t s and welfare of chi ldren and the decree 
and orders in a divorce proceeding are of a d i f fe rent and higher 
character than judgments in an act ion a t law. Dehm vs . Dehmf 
545 P.2d 525 (Utah 197 6 ) . The Supreme Court of Utah held t h a t 
an alimony award should, as far as poss ib le , equalize the 
p a r t i e s 1 respect ive s tandards of l iv ing and maintain them a t a 
level as close as possible t o the standard of l iv ing enjoyed 
during the marriage. Higley v s . Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 
1983). The Supreme Court held t h a t i t would not d is turb an 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n of property and award of alimony in a 
divorce proceeding, unless a c lea r and pre judic ia l abuse of 
d i sc re t ion i s shewn. In t h i s specif ic case, an award t o a wife 
of $100.0 0 per month permanent alimony was a c lear and 
p re jud ic ia l abuse of d i s c r e t i o n in view of the fact t ha t the 
wife was forty-seven years old, had a high school degree, and no 
income, t ha t her hea l th was poor, t ha t her e f fo r t s as a 
homemaker enabled the husband t o build a career as an a i r c r a f t 
welder, t h a t the husband had the a b i l i t y t o provide permanent 
support in an amount g rea te r than $10 0#0 0 per month, and tha t 
the award would not afford her a standard of l iv ing close t o the 
standard of l iv ing enjoyed during the marriage. The court 
found, with respect t o alimony, t h a t the c r i t e r i a in determining 
a reasonable award for support and maintenance included the 
f inancia l condit ions and needs of the wife, the a b i l i t y of the 
wife to produce a suf f ic ien t income for hersel f , and the a b i l i t y 
of the husband t o provide support* Id . a t 381. 
The purpose of alimony is t o enable the spouse who receives 
alimony to maintain, as nearly as poss ib le , a standard of l iv ing 
t h a t was enjoyed during the marriage. Jeppson vs . Jeppson, 684 
P.2d 69 (Utah 19 84), The c r i t e r i a t o be considered in awarding 
alimony include f inancial condit ions and needs of the wife, 
considering her s t a t i on in l i f e , her a b i l i t y to produce a 
suf f ic ien t income for herse l f , and the a b i l i t y of the husband t o 
provide support. XcU a t 69. The Supreme Court in t h i s case held 
t ha t a party who requests modification of a Divorce Decree must 
i n i t i a l l y shew t h a t subs tan t ia l change in circumstances of a t 
l e a s t one of the p a r t i e s has occurred. I d . a t 69. Modification 
must be founded on a material change of circumstances. Despain 
v s . Despain. 610 P.2d 203 (Utah 1980). See a l so , Williams VSt 
Shearwoodf No. 18 512-Utah August 15, 1984. 
The p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t referred t o the case of Johansson 
vs . Johansson, 65 P.2d 1316 (1983). The husband in t h i s case 
fa i led to susta in his burden of proving change of circumstances 
su f f i c ien t t o j u s t i fy modification of the S100.00 alimony award 
where the husband merely alleged t h a t the p a r t i e s had only been 
married for six months, t h a t he was not represented by counsel 
and t h a t his wife was fu l ly employed. The Supreme Court of Utah 
denied his appeal. The p l a i n t i f f further c i t e s the decision of 
the Utah Sta te Supreme Court in English v s . English, 565 P.2d 
409 (Utah 1977). The Supreme Court held t ha t an award of 
Si,0 00.0 0 in alimony and $2 50.0 0 in child support per month was 
f a i r and equi table and should have been directed considering the 
p a r t i e s ' twenty year marriage, e f fo r t s of each par ty , and the 
monetary success of the marriage, various ventures , and the 
husband's earnings . The court considered the c r i t e r i a of the 
f inanc ia l condi t ions and the needs of the wife, the a b i l i t y of 
the wife t o produce a su f f i c i en t income for herse l f , and the 
a b i l i t y of the husband t o provide support. The Supreme Court in 
t h i s specif ic case held t h a t the most important function of 
alimony is t o provide for the wife as nearly as possible a t the 
standard of l iv ing which she enjoyed during the marriage and t o 
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge. Xd. a t 409. The 
court fur ther held t h a t the length of the marriage and the 
cont r ibu t ions of each party to t h e i r j o i n t f inancia l success are 
not inappropriate measures t o determine alimony. 
The Supreme Court of Utah held t h a t when a divorced 
husband's income has increased subs t an t i a l l y and his former 
w i fe ' s income has increased much l e s s , and the needs of the 
chi ld have a l so increased, i t i s equi table t h a t the husband pay 
increased chi ld support . Chris t iansen vs . Chris t iansen, 667 P.2d 
592 (1983). The t r i a l court in t h i s case did not commit 
revers ib le e r ro r in denying a decrease in alimony by not making 
findings of fact supporting the rul ing in l i g h t of the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s f indings concerning the f inancia l s t a t u s of the p a r t i e s . 
The t r i a l court properly refused to decrease the alimony 
payments. In t h i s speci f ic case, the Divorce Decree gave the 
custody of the ch i ldren t o the p l a i n t i f f and required the 
defendant t o pay alimony of $6 50.0 0 per month and child support 
of $275.0 0 per month per ch i ld . The defendant husband had 
increased his gross income considerably since the Decree of 
Divorce when his net income was approximately $30,000.00 per 
year r or a subs tant ia l increase since the Decree of Divorce. 
The p l a i n t i f f - w i f e ' s net monthly income was $550.0 0 and was not 
a subs tan t ia l increase in her pr ior net monthly income. In the 
case a t bar f the p l a i n t i f f has had a subs tan t ia l increase in his 
income since the Decree of Divorce. In fact f the p l a i n t i f f has 
doubled his net monthly income since the entry of the Divorce 
Decree under his ret irement program. The defendant-respondent 
has had only a s l i g h t increase in her income on a monthly bas i s . 
The net monthly increase for the p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t has been 
subs tan t i a l ly greater than t h a t of the defendant-respondent. 
Therefore f there should not be a termination or decrease in the 
alimony payment t o the defendant-respondent. 
The p l a i n t i f f c i t e s the Utah S ta te Supreme Court decision 
of Haslam vs . Haslam. 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982) . The f ac t s of 
t h i s specif ic case indica te a subs tan t ia l change in 
circumstances warranting modification of the alimony award since 
the Decree of Divorce. In t h i s case, the former wife had 
obtained employment experienced a subs tan t ia l increase in 
income and accumulated some savings r while the former husband 
had r e t i r ed and received income in approximately the same amount 
as he received a t the time of the divorce some seventeen years 
previously. These are c l ea r ly not the fac t s and circumstances 
of the case before the cour t . The p l a i n t i f f was r e t i r ed years 
before the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The p l a i n t i f f has 
had a subs tan t i a l increase in income from his ret irement t o the 
effect t h a t i t has doubled since the entry of the Divorce 
Decree. The defendant-spouse has been working in the 
housekeeping department of the Holy Cross Hospital earning a 
ra ther nominal income and has not had a subs tan t ia l increase in 
incomef e spec ia l ly since the l a s t review of modification in 
1982# The al leged accumulation of savings of the defendant-
respondent by the p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t have no real foundation in 
t h a t the defendant-respondent has withdrawn the sums placed in to 
the c r e d i t union savings account for her care , support, 
maintenance and for home iirprovements. In f ac t r the defendant-
respondent has had t o r e l y upon income from her two chi ldren t o 
meet some of her debts and obl iga t ions and has t r i e d t o develop 
an individual re t i rment account t o provide herse l f with some 
ret i rement means a t the r a t e of $20.0 0 per month. The 
p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t has the benef i t s of complete medical 
coverage, specia l discount for purchases from the mi l i ta ry base 
and w i l l continue t o receive increases in his mi l i ta ry 
ret irement pay. The defendant-respondent w i l l not receive any 
ret i rement pay in l i g h t of her heal th f age and her mandatory 
future termination of employment before the ret irement benef i t s 
w i l l ves t in her favor a t the Holy Cross Hospi tal . At the same 
time f the pi a in t i f f - a p p e l l a n t has fa i led to explain his 
subs tan t ia l accumulation of savings and the expenditure of his 
share of proceeds f rom the sale of the home, his motorcyles and 
camper and the proceeds from the bonds which he acquired as a 
resu l t of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the mari tal f a c t s . The fac ts in 
the case a t bar c l ea r ly do not coincide with the fac ts in the 
case of Haslam vs . Haslam. 
In the Supreme Court decision of Olson vs . Olson, 15 Utah 
Adv.Rep.8 (No. 19280; August 2, 1985) a decree of divorce was 
granted t o p l a in t i f f -w i fe . The wife contended tha t the t r i a l 
court erred in awarding an insuf f ic ien t amount of alimonyf in 
ordering tha t the alimony terminate a f te r two years f and in 
f a i l i ng t o t r e a t the defendant 's earnings capacity as an asse t 
in dividing the mari tal property. The divorce decree granted 
the p l a i n t i f f alimony in the sun of $l f6 00.0 0 per month for a 
period of two years . The p l a i n t i f f f i led a Financial 
Declaration showing monthly l iv ing expenses of $5,500.00 for the 
e n t i r e family before separat ion. She estimated the future 
l iv ing expenses for herse l f and the three minor children t o be 
$4r200.00 per month. The defendant f i led a Financial 
Declaration shewing his monthly expenses t o be $2,837.00. His 
income f luctuated, depending upon cer ta in con t rac t s . His gross 
income was $76,485.00 in 1980, $62,603.00 in 1981, and 
$57,000.00 for the f i r s t nine months of 1982. At the time of 
t r i a l , the defendant was negotiat ing a cont rac t , which he 
expected t o obtain, and would bring $3,500.0 0 per month for the 
remainder of 1982. The Utah S ta te Supreme Court held t ha t i t 
would not d is turb the t r i a l court1 s d i s t r i b u t i o n of property and 
the award of alimony in a divorce proceeding, absent a c lear and 
p re ju -d ic i a l abuse of d i sc re t ion . The wife alleged t ha t the 
t r i a l court fa i led to consider the defendant-husband's a b i l i t y 
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to provide support as shewn by his historical earnings rather 
than his current income. The Utah State Supreme Court agreed 
with t the plaintiff's contention that the court's order that 
alimony terminate after two years was clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion. The court referred to the case of Jsm&s. 
vs. Jonesr Utah 700 P.2d 1072 r 1075 (1985) . The Utah S t a t e 
Supreme Court modified t h e dec ree t o provide for permanent 
alimony from defendant t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . The c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t 
t h e defendant could f u r t h e r p e t i t i o n t h e c o u r t t o modify t h e 
dec ree under i t s c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
In summaryf t h e de fendan t - re sponden t has not accumulated 
any s u b s t a n t i a l r e t i r e m e n t . The purpose of alimony i s t o 
provide t h e defendant w i t h t h e s tandard of l i v i n g t o which she 
was accustomed dur ing t h e course of t h e mar r i age . The 
de fendan t - r e sponden t ha s had t o r e l y upon her c h i l d r e n for means 
of suppor t because of t h e p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o 
main ta in h i s alimony payments in order for her t o meet her 
s tandard of l i v i n g . There has no t been a m a t e r i a l change of 
c i r cums tances in favor of t h e p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t and he has 
f a i l e d t o meet h i s burden of proof t o j u s t i f y a mod i f i ca t i on of 
t h e alimony by i t s t e r m i n a t i o n or r e d u c t i o n . 
POINT I I 
ALIMONY PAYMENTS CANNOT BE CHANGED OR MODIFIED AFTER THE 
INSTALLMENTS HAVE BECOME DUE. 
The Supreme Court of t h e S t a t e of Utah held t h a t alimony 
and suppor t payments become u n a l t e r a b l e d e b t s a s they accrue 
and, t h e r e f o r e , a p e r i o d i c i n s t a l l m e n t cannot be changed or 
modified a f t e r t h e i n s t a l l m e n t s have become due. Larsen VS« 
LaiLSSIlr 561 P.2d 1077 (1977). See Section 78-45(b)-3-6 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended). The ins ta l lments of support 
payments ordered in a divorce decree become vested in the 
rec ip ien t when they become due. Coleman vs . Coleman. 664 P.2d 
1155 (Utah 1983). The court found t h a t the defendant-husband 
knew what was required by the previous court order and he had 
the a b i l i t y to comply with such order and he wi l ful ly and 
knowingly fai led and refused t o do so. The court found t ha t the 
defendant in t h a t case to be in contempt of court . The 
p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t in the case a t bar has c lea r ly accrued 
ce r ta in ins ta l lments of alimony for the support and maintenance 
of the defendant-respondent. Those payments have become vested 
and cannot be modified on a r e t roac t ive bas i s . Until an order 
of the court has been entered, no modification can occur. 
A judgment for alimony payable in monthly or other periodic 
payments cannot be changed or modified a f te r the ins ta l lments 
have become due. Scott vs . Scot t . 19 Utah 2d 267 430 P.2d 580 
(1967). The Supreme Court of Utah held t ha t the r igh t t o 
accrued alimony instal lment payments had vested in the wife on 
the due date of each instal lment and the wife was en t i t l ed t o 
i n t e r e s t thereon a t the legal r a t e u n t i l the payment was made, 
and the t r i a l court had no pcwer or authori ty to change or 
modify the Nevada judgment as t o the accrued ins ta l lments of 
alimony. Xd. a t 580. The defendant-appellant in the case a t bar 
i s not only e n t i t l e d t o a judgment for a l l arrearages in alimony 
but a l so for i n t e r e s t a t the legal r a t e in accordance with the 
Supreme Court ru l ing . 
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The Supreme Court of Dtah held that ins ta l lments of alimony 
become vested when they become duef and the court has no power 
t o modify the decree as t o them; andf therea f t er , i n t e r e s t 
accrues a t the l e g a l r a t e . Bates v s . Bates , 560 P.2d 706 (1977). 
The reasoning of the court was tha t i t i l l behooves a court t o 
r e l i e v e a defaul t ing ex-husband from paying h i s alimony ob l iga -
t i o n because h i s ex -wi fe may be forced t o l i v e a l i f e which i s 
not approved by the judge, and which l i f e s t y l e i s a resu l t of 
not being able t o c o l l e c t her l e g a l en t i t l ements , and t h i s i s 
e s p e c i a l l y true when the ex-husband has made no motion t o be 
re l i eved of h i s o b l i g a t i o n t o pay alimony. XcU a t 7 07. 
In sunmary, the Utah S ta te Supreme Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y 
held that any alimony ins ta l lment payments become due and cannot 
be a l tered r e t r o a c t i v e l y or modified u n t i l an order of the 
court . The r e l i e f sought by the p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t i s c l e a r l y 
unfounded and, there fore , the defendant-respondent i s e n t i t l e d 
t o the judgment for alimony which was awarded by the t r i a l 
court . The defendant-respondent i s further e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f 
of i n t e r e s t a t the l e g a l rate in accordance with these Supreme 
Court d e c i s i o n s of twelve percent (12%) per annum. 
POINT I I I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY IN A DIVORCE 
PROCEEDING IS NOT TO BE DISTURBED, UNLESS THERE IS A 
CLEAR AND PREJUDICIAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that i t w i l l not disturb 
an t r i a l court1 s d i s t r i b u t i o n of property and award of alimony 
in a divorce proceeding, u n l e s s a c l ear and pre jud ic ia l abuse of 
d i s c r e t i o n i s shown. Higley v s . Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 
1983). The Supreme Court of Utah has further held that the 
divorce courts are deemed to have broad equitable powers in 
safeguarding the interests and welfare of the children and the 
decree and orders in a divorce proceeding are of a different and 
higher character than judgments in an action at law. Dehm vs. 
Itelmw 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976). 
A husband appealed a decision of the tr ial court wherein 
the tr ial court acted within i t s discretion in applying the 
commonly accepted definition of the term "equity" interpreting a 
written stipulation of the parties which was incorporated into 
the divorce decree. The Supreme Court of Utah held that in 
dividing property between divorcing spouses, the tr ial court is 
governed by general principles of equity. Land vs. Landf 6 05 
P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980). The trial court acted well within i t s 
discretion in applying the commonly accepted definition of the 
term "equity" to interpret a written stipulation incorporated 
into a divorce decreer wherein the parties agreed that the wife 
would receive as sole property a fifty percent interest in the 
"present equity" of certain real property and that the husband 
would receive as sole property a fifty percent interest in that 
"equity". Id. at 1249. 
The Supreme Court of this State has held in both the 
formulation of a divorce decree or ary modifications thereof, 
the tr ial court is vested with broad discretionary powers which 
may be disturbed by the appellate court only in the presence of 
clear abuse thereof. Despain vs. Despainr 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 
- 7R -
1980). The Supreme Court in t h a t case affirmed the decision of 
the t r i a l court which adopted a separat ion agreement as par t of 
the terms of the decree of divorce by which the former wife 
rel inquished any and a l l other claims against the former husband 
so as t o c o n s t i t u t e a complete separat ion and d iv is ion of the 
mar i ta l e s t a t e and by such ac t ions the former wife contracted 
away a l l r i gh t s t o the t r u s t r e s of the ce r ta in t r u s t se t up by 
the p a r t i e s . 
A p e t i t i o n was f i l ed by an ex-wife asking t ha t an eleven 
year rusty divorce decree be d i s in te r red and vacated and asking 
the t r i a l court f in substance and effect f t o re t ry the case, or 
f a i l i ng tha t f t o reappra ise the property r igh t and support 
mat te rs . The F i r s t D i s t r i c t Court gave judgment t o the wife for 
ar rearages in chi ld support payments a f te r deducting payments 
made, and the ex-wife appealed. The Utah S ta te Supreme Court 
held t h a t the t r i a l cour t did not abuse i t s d i sc re t ion . The 
Utah S ta te Supreme Court held t h a t the refusal t o vacate an 
eleven year f rusty divorce decree and t o re t ry the case, or 
f a i l i ng t h a t , t o reappra ise the property r igh t and support 
mat te rs , but giving judgment t o the ex-wife for arrearages in 
chi ld support payments a f t e r deducting payments made, did not 
c o n s t i t u t e an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . McBride vs . McBride. 29 Utah 
2d 459, 511 P.2d 730 (1973). 
A former husband appealed from an order of the Fourth 
D i s t r i c t Court of Utah County granting the former wi fe ' s motion 
for modification of divorce decree. The Supreme Court of Utah 
held t h a t no compelling reasons were shewn by the former wife 
which would warrant modifications of property d ispos i t ion 
port ion of the divorce decree. The Utah Sta te Supreme Court 
held t h a t the t r i a l court s i t t i n g in a divorce matter r e t a in s 
continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n to make such modifications of the 
i n i t i a l decree of divorce as i t deems j u s t and equi table f but 
where no appeal is taken from the or ig ina l decree f change of 
circumstances must be shown t o j u s t i fy l a t e r modification. 
Foulger vs . Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981). The Utah Sta te 
Supreme Court further held t h a t the t r i a l court should be 
re luc tan t t o grant modification of provisions of a divorce 
decree which dispose of real property and grant such 
modifications only upon showing of compelling reasons ar i s ing 
from subs tan t ia l and material change in circumstances. I&, a t 
412. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chander vs . West, 610 P.2d 1299 
(Utah 1980) held t h a t where a property sett lement agreement 
incorporated in a decree of divorce unequivocably required the 
husband to continue making mortgage paymentsf the husband could 
not subsequently avoid the obl igat ion t o continue making 
mortgage payments when the wife remarried and sold the house on 
the ground t h a t the agreement had been entered in to by mistake. 
The Utah Sta te Supreme Court further held t h a t property 
set t lement are not sacrosanct and are not beyond the power of 
the court of equity to modify and i t i s within the t r i a l cou r t ' s 
authori ty t o modify or e l iminate an obl iga t ion t o make payments 
i f obviously changed circumstances under t r a d i t i o n a l equity 
standards so requi re . Xd. a t 1299. 
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In t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t and d e f e n d a n t -
respondent went t o t r i a l on t h e i r c a s e . The mat ter was a d j u d i -
c a t e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . Paragraph 3 of t h e Decree of Divorce 
awards t h e p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t h i s motor v e h i c l e s ; namely f 1973 
C h e v r o l e t p ickup t r u c k r 197 3 camper, 1965 I n t e r n a t i o n a l s c o u t . 
He i s a l s o awarded v a r i o u s p e r s o n a l h a n d t o o l s f four shotguns f 
two r i f l e s , p i s t o l , p e r s o n a l p o s s e s s i o n s and e f f e c t s now in h i s 
p o s s e s s i o n . in paragraph 4 of t h e Decree of D i v o r c e , t h e 
d e f e n d a n t - r e s p o n d e n t was awarded a l l of t h e f u r n i s h i n g s and 
e f f e c t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e f i x t u r e s and a p p l i a n c e s and o ther 
p e r s o n a l proper ty in t h e home of t h e p a r t i e s no t awarded t o t h e 
p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t . I t i s c l e a r from t h e language of t h e 
Decree of D ivorce t h a t t h e p e r s o n a l i tems of t h e p l a i n t i f f -
a p p e l l a n t were awarded t o t h e d e f e n d a n t - r e s p o n d e n t . The 
p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t now s e e k s r e t u r n of c e r t a i n i tems t o him 
more than s e v e n y e a r s a f t e r t h e entry of t h e Decree of Divorce 
and t h e d i v i s i o n of t h e p e r s o n a l property of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . 
The recommendation of t h e Domestic R e l a t i o n s Commissioner was 
t h a t t h e i tems c la imed by t h e p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t should remain 
w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t - r e s p o n d e n t . The t r i a l c o u r t upheld t h e 
recommendation of t h e Domest ic R e l a t i o n s Commissioner. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS DISCRETION TO AWARD ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS AGAINST ONE OF THE PARTIES IN A MODIFICATION 
PROCEEDING. 
The p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t c la ims in h i s B r i e f on Appeal t h a t 
an award of a t t o r n e y s f e e s must r e s t on a b a s i s of e v i d e n c e of 
need and r e a s o n a b l e n e s s . He c i t e s t h e c a s e of Kerr VS Kerr* 618 
o o 
P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980). The p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t has 
brought numerous modification proceedings against the defendant-
respondent and has fa i led t o obtain ary modification in the 
pas t . The defendant-respondent has had t o defend these claims 
in each instance successful ly. Once again, the t r i a l court in 
t h i s proceeding, has refused t o modify the alimony provision in 
the Decree of Divorce as requested by the p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t . 
The income and expense information of both p a r t i e s c lear ly 
ind ica tes the need of the defendant-respondent t o reimbursement 
for attorney fees , the issue of reasonableness was obvious to 
the t r i a l court and the Honorable John Rokich awarded an 
a t t o rney ' s fee in favor of the defendant-respondent in the sum 
of $1,5 00.0 0 plus her cos ts of court incurred in the t r i a l 
proceeding. The Utah Sta te Supreme Court in the case of 
Anderson vs . Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962) held 
t ha t the t r i a l court has d i sc re t ion , upon examination of fac ts 
upon a motion for modification of a divorce decree, t o determine 
i f the circumstances do or do not demand an award of cos ts 
against one of the p a r t i e s . The Utah Sta te Supreme Court 
fur ther held t h a t the divorced wife was e n t i t l e d t o an award of 
counsel fees for contest ing the p e t i t i o n of the modification of 
the divorce decree to award him custody of the chi ldren and t o 
terminate an award of support money, i d . a t 264. 
Pla in t i f f brought a proceeding to enforce the divorce 
decree provision under which the ex-husband was obliged to pay 
any medical and dental care of the two minor children of the 
p a r t i e s . The Fourth D i s t r i c t Court awarded judgment for the 
p l a i n t i f f and the ex-husband appealed. The Supreme Court of 
Utah held t h a t the t r i a l court cor rec t ly ru les t ha t the 
insurance premiums paid by ex-wife, who providently procured and 
paid for medical insurance which covered the medical and dental 
expenses in quest ion were ac tua l ly a necessary medical expense 
for the chi ldren for which the ex-husband was l i a b l e , although 
the re was no de ta i led presen ta t ion of f ac t s es tab l i sh ing the 
r e q u i s i t e fac to rs t o support an award of at torneys fees , the 
f ac t s i i rp l i c i t in t h i s proceeding and the evidence necessar i ly 
presented t o the t r i a l judge, together with the de minimis 
nature of the award, cons t i tu ted a su f f i c ien t basis t o sustain 
the t r i a l c o u r t ' s exerc i se of i t s d i sc re t ion in awarding the 
wife $125.00 in at torney fees . Beardall vs . Beardal l . 629 P.2d 
425 (Utah 1981). 
In summary, the t r i a l court properly ruled based upon the 
issue of need and reasonableness t h a t the defendant-respondent 
should be awarded her attorney fees in t h i s case. The 
defendant-respondent was required t o defend her pos i t ion 
r e l a t i v e to ce r t a in claims made for modification by the 
p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t , for which he was unsuccessful. The court 
c l ea r ly has the d i s c r e t i on t o award such attorney fees and 
properly did so. 
CONCL USON 
The p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t has fa i led t o e s t ab l i sh his burden 
of proof t o j u s t i f y modification of his alimony payments t o the 
defendant-respondent. There has not been a material change of 
circumstances in h is favor. In f ac t , the re has been an increase 
of income by the p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t , which i s subs tan t i a l ly 
greater than any increase in the income by defendant-respondent. 
The p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t has fa i led t o explain the investment and 
use of subs tan t ia l suns of money received under the Decree of 
Divorce, The defendant-respondent i s en t i t l ed t o maintain a 
standard of l iv ing t o which she was accustomed a t the time of 
the Divorce Decree. Therefore/ the t r i a l court properly ordered 
the continuation of alimony payments in the sum of $200.0 0 per 
month without reduction. 
The defendant-respondent is c lea r ly e n t i t l e d to her 
judgment for alimony arrearage in t h a t the instal lment payments 
of alimony became vested when they became due. The p l a in t i f f -
appel lant cannot modify r e t roac t ive ly the pr ior order of the 
t r i a l cour t . 
The personal property in the possession of the defendant-
respondent was properly awarded t o her . The language in the 
Decree of Divorce c lea r ly s e t s for th t ha t property which was 
awarded t o her . The p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t comes back in excess of 
seven (7) years l a t e r to make demand for cer ta in items of 
personal property awarded t o the defendant-respondent under the 
Decree of Divorce. The p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t has not shown any 
material change of circumstance t o j u s t i f y a modification of the 
property sett lement in the Decree of Divorce, Therefore, the 
language of the Decree of Divorce i s enforceable in t ha t the 
p l a in t i f f - appe l l an t did not seek an appeal of the decision of 
the t r i a l court r e l a t i ve t o the d iv is ion of the mari tal e s t a t e f 
as outl ined in the Decree of Divorce. 
The t r i a l court properly awarded the defendant-respondent 
her reasonable attorney f e e s and for c o s t s of court upon the 
bas i s of reasonableness and the evidence of need. The 
p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t has returned t o the t r i a l court on numerous 
occas ions t o seek a modi f icat ion of the alimony without success . 
He has f a i l e d t o demonstrate on each occasion a material change 
of circumstance and has caused the defendant-respondent to 
expend large sums of money in the defense of her p o s i t i o n . 
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